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THE DANGERS OF THE REFERENCE QUESTION: 
SCC V. SCOTUS 
Mark Mina Mikhaiel, Esq.* 
ABSTRACT: This article deals with diverging approaches to the question of a legal 
reference in Canada and the United States. A reference is a hypothetical question of law 
posed to a court. In Canada references are accepted whereas in the United States they are 
prohibited as violating the separation of powers doctrine and unconstitutional under 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Canada should eliminate the reference procedure and 
limit judges to opine on matters of actual controversy, as is the case in the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In American law schools, first-year students are taught the parameters of 
judicial power.1 The exercise of judicial power in the United States is limited to 
“cases” and “controversies.”2 Thus, the U.S. Constitution precludes the judicial 
arm from offering advisory opinions.3 This is because, as Justice Frankfurter 
stated, “it is extremely dangerous to encourage extension of the device of 
advisory opinions to constitutional controversies, in view, of the nature of the 
crucial constitutional questions and the conditions for their wise adjudication.”4 
In a broad sense, the reasoning for this is that “the statutory and constitutional 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish,”). 
 2 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (“Beyond this it does not extend, 
and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the 
power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.”). 
 3 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n. 2 (1792) (“That by the Constitution of the 
United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, 
and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either.”). 
 4 Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1002 (1924). 
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elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration 
of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even confining 
them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.”5 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) has opined that granting advisory 
opinions, which is when a court “pronounce[s] upon the meaning or the 
constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, 
by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”6 Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the majority in Hollingsworth v. Perry, reiterated that Article III, Sec. 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution is vitally important in limiting the judiciary’s power, as it 
forbids judges from becoming policymakers and “ensures that [they] act as 
judges.”7 Thus, SCOTUS has unequivocally admonished the idea of rendering 
advisory opinions. 
In contrast to the U.S. judiciary, the Canadian judicial branch actively 
engages in policy creation. This is especially evident in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s (“SCC”) use of advisory opinions, i.e., “reference questions.”8 A 
reference question is defined as a request for an advisory opinion, which is 
granted before actual litigation regarding the validity of proposed action or 
legislation. Because of its strategic usage of advisory opinions, some scholars 
have referred to the SCC “as a court of law and a political court.”9 
II. ROADMAP 
In Part I, this paper defines a reference question as implemented in Canada. 
Part II, III and IV provides a brief background on the constitutional and historical 
roots of reference questions and examines the current implementation of the 
reference procedure by the SCC and its authoritative effect. Part V and VI 
examine the positive and negative effects of the reference procedure, and the 
abuse of the device by the executive and legislative branches. Part VII analyzes 
the constitutional policies admonishing advisory opinions in the United States. 
Finally, part VIII concludes that Canada should eliminate the reference 
procedure and limit judges to opine only on matters of actual controversy, as in 
the United States. 
 
 5 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101- 02 (1998). See also 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
 6 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, at 102. 
 7 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 8 See EMMETT MACFARLANE, GOVERNING FROM THE BENCH: THE SCC AND THE JUDICIAL 
ROLE 1 (UBC Press 2013) (“The Court has evolved from a largely legal, dispute resolving 
body into a policy-making institution whose decisions have far reaching implications for 
virtually all areas of Canada’s political, social, cultural, and economic life.”). 
 9 See DONALD R. SONGER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCC: AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION 7 (University of Toronto Press 2008) (“[W]hile it is still fashionable to think of 
the work of courts as divorced from the often disdained world of politics, to properly 
understand the current Court one must understand it as a court of law and a political court.”). 
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III. DEFINITION OF REFERENCE QUESTION 
Prior to conducting an analysis on the nature of the reference question, a 
working definition is required. As discussed above, the term “reference question” 
is synonymous with “advisory opinion,” which has been defined as follows: 
Nonbinding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter 
submitted for that purpose. [American] Federal courts are constitutionally 
prohibited from issuing advisory opinions by the case-or-controversy 
requirement, but other courts, such as the International Court of Justice, 
render them routinely.10 
The opening words of this definition point most clearly to the blatant 
characteristics of the advisory opinion. A “nonbinding statement by a court of its 
interpretation of the law” is characterized by two main features: (i) it cannot be a 
decision by a court on the actual merits, and (ii) there is an absence of rival 
litigants.11 That is, the advisory opinion is rendered not on demand of a 
complaining party, but on demand of an administrative body. A “reference 
question” is defined as “the act of sending or directing to another for 
information, service, consideration or decision; esp., the act of sending a case to 
a master or referrer for information or decision.”12 In other words, a “reference 
question” is the formal request for an advisory opinion. 
Equipped with an understanding of these terms, let us turn our attention to 
the statutory jurisdiction of the SCC. 
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE SCC 
The Supreme Court Act (“SCA”) authorizes the SCC to render reference 
opinions on proposed questions of law that are submitted by legislators and other 
governmental officials, even though they are not actually presented in the form 
of a concrete case at law. Section 53 of the SCA provides: 
(1) The Governor in Council [i.e., the federal cabinet] may refer to the 
Court for hearing and consideration important questions of law or fact 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts; 
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or provincial 
legislation; 
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters, by the 
Constitution Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested in the 
Governor in Council; or 
 
 10 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (10th ed. 2014). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 1470. 
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(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures of the 
provinces, or of the respective governments thereof, whether or not the 
particular power in question has been or is proposed to be exercised. 
(2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing and 
consideration important questions of law or fact concerning any matter, 
whether or not in the opinion of the Court ejusdem generis with the 
enumerations contained in subsection (1), with reference to which the 
Governor in Council sees fit to submit any such question. 
(3) Any question concerning any of the matters mentioned in subsections 
(1) and (2), and referred to the Court by the Governor in Council, shall be 
conclusively deemed to be an important question.13 
In the seminal case, In Re Secession of Quebec,14 the SCC concluded that it 
had both the authority and duty to issue reference opinions.15 In its opinion, the 
SCC noted that since the Canadian Constitution does not require a strict 
separation of powers, both Parliament and provincial legislatures “may properly 
confer certain judicial functions on the courts.”16 In addition, the SCC 
determined that it had the authority to render such an advisory opinion on the 
proposed separation of Quebec from Canada, since secession involved a “legal 
question touching and concerning the future of the Canadian federation.”17 As 
the SCC was (and still is) not under the same “case and controversies” 
requirement like the SCOTUS, it did not have to wait until the conclusion of the 
Quebec referendum prior to opining on the legality of the proposed referendum. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Though the rendering of advisory opinions may appear to constitute an ultra 
vires act, answers to reference questions are unequivocally constitutional. 
However, in the 1910 References by the Governor-General in Council, every 
province except for Saskatchewan moved that the SCC ought not deliberate on 
certain issues, such as the validity of the Insurance Act. The provinces reasoned 
that this should be the case because a court cannot properly consider these 
 
 13 Supreme Court Act, § 53(1-3) (2014). 
 14 In short, the federal government requested an opinion regarding the legality of Quebec’s 
separation from Canada via a provincial referendum. 
 15 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) [hereafter referred to as 
In Re Secession of Quebec, ¶8 (“Section 53 is defined by two leading characteristics – it 
establishes an original jurisdiction in this Court and imposes a duty on the Court to render 
advisory opinions.”)]. 
 16 Id. at ¶15 (“[T]he Canadian Constitution does not insist on a strict separation of 
powers. Parliament and the provincial legislatures may properly confer other legal functions 
on the courts. . . Thus, even though the rendering of advisory opinions is quite clearly done 
outside the framework of adversarial litigation, and such opinions are traditionally obtained by 
the executive from the law officers of the Crown, there is no constitutional bar to this Court’s 
receipt of jurisdiction to undertake such an advisory role. The legislative grant of reference 
jurisdiction found in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act is therefore constitutionally valid.”) 
 17 Id. at ¶ 19. 
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matters or by the individual members thereof in the proper execution of their 
judicial duties.18 On appeal, Lord Loreburn, writing for the Board of Commerce, 
rebuffed their concerns, as follows: 
The provinces . . . say that when a Court of Appeal from all the provincial 
Courts is authorized to be set up, that carries with it an implied condition 
that the Court of Appeal shall be in truth a judicial body according to the 
conception of judicial character obtaining in caviling countries and 
especially obtaining in Great Britain, to whose Constitution the 
Constitution of Canada is intended to be similar . . . And they say that to 
place the duty of answering questions, such as the Canadian Act under 
consideration does require the Court to answer, is incompatible with the 
maintenance of such judicial character or of public confidence in it, or with 
the free access to an unbiased tribunal of appeal to which litigants in the 
provincial Courts are of right entitled. This argument in truth arraigns the 
lawfulness of so treating a Court upon the ground that a Court liable to be 
so treated ceases to be such a judiciary as the Constitution provides 
for. . . If, notwithstanding the liability to answer questions the Supreme 
Court is still a judiciary within the meaning of the British North America 
Act, then there is no ground for saying that the impugned Canadian Act is 
ultra vires.19 
Questions asked by the executive, although broad, can be lawfully reviewed 
by the SCC. Law, wisdom, and comity require the SCC to accept requests to 
issue an advisory opinion. One can argue that an advisory opinion is helpful as it 
gives direction to the “rudderless ship of state on its first voyage.”20 
As legal scholar Peter Hogg explains, the “reference question” procedure 
deviates from typical judicial duties in two key ways: (1) there is an absence of a 
genuine dispute or controversy between two parties; and (2) the judiciary is 
engaging in a function that is traditionally the responsibility of the executive 
branch of government. Notwithstanding, the Canadian system is one that 
facilitates, and requires, the judiciary to review and decide not only constitutional 
questions, but also political questions.21 Aharon Barak, former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Israeli, speaking on the increased reliance on high courts in 
dealing with issues of law states that, “nothing falls beyond the purview of the 
judicial review; the world is filled with law; anything and everything is 
justiciable.” Though the Canadian legislature routinely defers to the judiciary 
through the “reference question” procedure, it is at times viewed as an intrusion 
 
 18 In Re References by the Governor-General in Council, [1910] 43 S.C.R. 536, 537 
(Can.). 
 19 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1912] A.C. 571 at pp. 
584-85 (Can.). 
 20 In re Request for Advisory Op. etc., 281 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Mich. 1979). 
 21 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, p. 8-17 (Carswell, Student ed. 
2012). 
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“into the prerogatives of legislatures and executives, and a corresponding 
acceleration of the process whereby political agenda have been judicialized.”22 
VI. BINDING? 
Prima facie, the SCC’s rationale behind the “reference question” opinion is 
not to bind parties; rather, it is to obviate (to whatever degree it can) the extent to 
which problematic questions of law naturally proceed to appellate courts. 
Specifically, in Manitoba Education Reference, the SCC held that: 
 . . . our answers to the questions submitted will bind no one [ . . . ] not 
even this court. We give no judgment, we determine nothing, we end no 
controversy, and whatever our answers may be, should it be deemed 
expedient at any time by [an interested party] to impugn the 
constitutionality of any measure that might hereinafter be taken by the 
federal authorities. . . whether such measure is in accordance with or in 
opposition to, the answers to this consultation, the recourse in the usual 
way, to the courts of the country remains open to them.23 
Interestingly, the SCC describes the rendering of an advisory opinion as a 
mere “consultation.” Thus, it is apparent from early Canadian judicial history, 
that the rendering of such opinions was purely diagnostic, ameliorative and 
designed to increase the scope of preventative justice. More recently, in In Re 
Secession of Quebec the Court reiterated this position: 
In the context of a reference, the Court, rather than acting in its traditional 
adjudicative function, is acting in an advisory capacity. The very fact that the 
Court may be asked hypothetical questions in a reference, such as the 
constitutionality of proposed legislation, engages the Court in an exercise it 
would never entertain in the context of litigation. No matter how closely the 
procedure on a reference may mirror the litigation process, a reference does not 
engage the Court in a disposition of rights. For the same reason, the Court may 
deal on a reference with issues that might otherwise be considered not yet “ripe” 
for decision.24 
Even though from an academic perspective reference opinions are deemed 
“advisory only,” in actuality they are treated like binding opinions. Specifically, 
Lord Simon stated: 
Their lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to His 
Majesty they are not absolutely bound by previous decisions of the 
Board. . . But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the 
 
 22 Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global 
Trend, 15 CAN. J. OF L. AND JURIS 191, 19 (2002). 
 23 In Re Statutes of Manitoba relating to Education, [1894], 22 S.C.R. 577 at p. 678 
(Can.). 
 24 In Re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217 at p. 219 at ¶25 (Can.). 
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Board would not depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed 
will have been acted on by governments and subjects.25 
Nevertheless, though reference questions are not actually binding on anyone 
(as there is an absence of rival litigants, only government hypotheticals), they are 
regarded as authoritative.26 
VII. EFFECTIVE? 
As one can imagine, the history behind the use of reference questions is less 
than perfect. That is, the effectiveness of the process has been questioned in the 
past and continues today. One of its proponents is Justice Barry Strayer, former 
Justice of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal and later a Deputy Judge of the 
Federal Court of Canada. Justice Strayer argues that the reference procedure is a 
bureaucratic device that allows each level of government to police the 
constitutional authority of the other.27 As a result, it swiftly enables each arm of 
government indirect oversight over the other. That is, the use of reference 
questions provides a quasi-flexible path for each branch of government to 
challenge the constitutionality of the others actions. 
While private litigation is considered a compelling method in the resolution 
of constitutional issues, the use of the “reference question” procedure has been 
deemed more effective since it is an expeditious process with a timelier judicial 
opinion.28 In addition, there are “emergency conditions, such as war [that] make 
it imperative that government be assured at once of the validity of proposed 
action.”29 Expeditiousness aside, Justice Strayer believes that the impact of 
reference is immeasurable: 
In terms of impact on the political, social, and economic affairs of the 
country the decisions in these cases have had an effect far beyond their 
numerical proportion. It is therefore essential in any study of judicial 
review of legislation in Canada to give some particular attention to this 
device.30 
Notwithstanding, the ability to swiftly come to a determination of 
constitutional questions, the use of reference questions is not without 
disadvantages. First, as seen in Reference re Insurance Act, due to a lack of 
adequate factual context, the opinion was drafted in the abstract.31 Specifically, 
in Reference re Insurance Act, the single reference question promulgated to the 
 
 25 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at p. 
206. 
 26 Id. 
 27 BARRY STRAYER, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS: THE FUNCTION AND 
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. (2nd ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1988). 
 28 Id. at 312; The determination of important reference questions is not only expeditious; it 
is without expense to private litigants. 
 29 Id. at 313. 
 30 Id. at 311. 
 31 Id. at 315. 
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SCC was, “[a]re sections 40 and 70 of the ‘Insurance Act, 1910, or any or what 
part or parts of the said sections, ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada?” No 
additional factual information was provided or even presented to the SCC. 
While the result in Reference re Insurance Act is less important than the 
steps and process the SCC took to render the advisory opinion, as one can 
imagine, absent a proper factual foundation, courts often err.32 In addition, the 
use of reference questions may revolve around questions that are simply not 
justiciable. As discussed above, the Supreme Court Act allows the executive and 
legislative arms to refer any “matter” to the courts. Prima facie, this appears to 
include not only questions of law, but perhaps, even non-legal questions, such as 
politics, science, technology and medicine. In Re Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution, the SCC attempted to clarify the parameters surrounding any 
matter, stating that courts “have a discretion to refuse to answer such questions 
[that are not justiciable].”33 
Initially, the SCC attempted to limit the scope of reviewable questions. Yet, 
two decades later, in Northern Telecom Canada Ltd. v. Communication Workers 
of Canada, the SCC asserts itself as the entity of government that is “to control 
the limits of the respective sovereignties.”34 In other words, the SCC unilaterally 
opens the floodgates for reviewing future legislation. Equipped with this 
precedent, in In Re Secession of Quebec, the SCC goes on to hold that since the 
Canadian Constitution does not insist on a true separation of powers, there is “no 
constitutional bar to this Court’s receipt of jurisdiction to undertake such an 
advisory role.”35 To the SCC, the lack of an advisory opinion can paralyze 
legislative action or encourage erroneous action that, if ruled unconstitutional, 
might well be an unrivaled mess to unravel. 
VIII. ABUSE? 
The Canadian executive and legislative branches have previously abused the 
purpose of the advisory opinion. This was specifically the case when “reference 
questions” were used to validate the Bennett New Deal, which is not understood 
to be W.L. Mackenzie King’s attempt to delay the introduction of the law for 
purely political reasons36 Another reference posed to the SCC, with the hopes 
 
 32 In Reference re Insurance Act, [1932], 1 D.L.R. 97 (Can.) dealt with legislation 
requiring federal registration of insurance companies. Ultimately, the Court struck down the 
legislation as the statute was deemed to regulate a “trade” within a particular province. That is, 
the Canadian insurance business was deemed to be a “trade,” hence not susceptible to federal 
control. 
 33 In Re Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, at p. 768. 
 34 Northern Telecom Canada Ltd. v. Communication Workers of Canada [1983] 1 S.C.R. 
733, at p. 741. 
 35 In Re Secession of Quebec, ¶15. 
 36 With an election on the horizon and with a capable opponent, W.L. Mackenzie King, 
gaining support, then Prime Minister Bennett promised a more progressive taxation system, a 
minimum wage, unemployment insurance, health and accident insurance, a revised old-age 
pension and agricultural support programs for all Canadians. Modeling his strategy on 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States, Bennett took to the radio 
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that a judicial proclamation would ease the political environment, involved the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage.37 Similarly, In Re Secession of Quebec, 
the reference involving the constitutionality of the people of Quebec voting on 
their separation from Canada, is now understood to have been a political play by 
the Chrétien government to influence public opinion on the constitutionality of 
the proposed separation. 
However convenient the reference procedure may be in the short run, there 
are significant dangers accompanying its use. Namely, it provides the unelected 
judiciary significant latitude to determine politically charged issues, thus shaping 
Canadian law. As the examples illustrate, by engaging in such review, the SCC 
places itself in the position of not only judging the constitutionality of proposed 
legislation, but also the underlying merits. As a result, political scientists and 
jurists coined the term “judicialization of politics” to both describe the use of the 
reference procedure to determine hotly contested political issues and imply that 
courts have intruded on powers, such as law making, originally belonging to the 
legislature.38 
A metaphor often used to describe the role of Canadian courts is that of a 
neutral referee exercising excessive control over a sporting event. While referees 
are essential to the smooth administration of organized sports, a good referee 
avoids interference and goes unnoticed in the background. Unfortunately, armed 
with the ability to review and invalidate proposed laws, Canadian courts have 
developed a considerably more controversial persona as a non-elected arm of 
government with, possibly, their own legislative ambitions. 
Over 100 years ago, speaking of the challenges Canadian jurists face using 
the reference procedure, Lord Chancellor Haldane said, 
 . . . it is at times attended with inconveniences, and it is not surprising that 
the Supreme Court of the United States should have steadily refused to 
adopt a similar procedure, and should have confined itself to adjudication 
on the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.39 
 
airwaves with a series of speeches coined the “New Deal for Canada.” The New Deal was 
Bennett’s last-ditch effort to rejuvenate the image for the Tories. 
 37 Twelve years prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015), the SCC resolved the 
validity of same-sex marriage laws in Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
As a result of several of the provinces’ appellate courts holding that same-sex marriage was 
constitutionally valid, the Government of Canada submitted three questions to the Supreme 
Court regarding the validity of its proposed same-sex marriage legislation. In short, the SCC 
found that the meaning of marriage is not fixed to what it meant in 1867, but rather it must 
evolve with Canadian society which currently represents a plurality of groups. (“The “frozen 
concepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian 
constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive 
interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life. Read expansively, the 
word “marriage” in s. 91(26) does not exclude same-sex marriage.”) 
 38 PAUL HOWE AND PETER H. RUSSELL, JUDICIAL POWER AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY, 255-
96 (McGill-Queens ed. 2001). 
 39 Attorney General for British Columbia v. Attorney General for Canada [1914] A. C. 
153, 162. For further animadversions on advisory pronouncements by judges, see Lord 
Chancellor Sankey in In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada [1932] A. 
9
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It appears that even influential members of the Privy Council recognized, 
early on, the risks of utilizing the advisory opinion. 
IX. TREATMENT OF ADVISORY OPINIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The power of English judges to deliver advisory opinions was well 
established at the time the United States Constitution was drafted.40 Thus, the 
implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not tradition alone, impose the rule 
against advisory opinions on American courts. The rule against advisory 
opinions recognizes that such suits often “are not pressed before the Court with 
that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and 
necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect 
of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.”41 The 
SCOTUS recently opined, 
 . . . the Article III prohibition against advisory opinions reflects the 
complementary constitutional considerations expressed by the justiciability 
doctrine: Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine 
federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and 
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the 
judicial process.42 
The rationale behind American courts refusing to render advisory opinions is 
simple: (i) Article III requires that there be a case or controversy at issue and (ii) 
the objection ensures the preservation of the judiciary as an independent body of 
government. The SCOTUS avoids the high-stakes political thrillers that hinder 
its northern neighbor.43 Thus, the SCOTUS renders an opinion only if it is aware 
of all facts and pertinent stakeholders. 
The doctrine of separation of powers is the main reason why American 
courts refuse to render advisory opinions. The SCOTUS has consistently 
reaffirmed the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that the 
separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to 
the preservation of liberty.44 
Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said, “[n]o 
political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the 
 
C. 54, 66: “We sympathize with the view expressed at length by Newcombe, J., which was 
concurred in by the Chief Justice, [of Canada] as to the difficulty which the Court must 
experience in endeavoring to answer questions put to it in this way.” 
 40 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 127-128 (1958). 
 41 United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961). 
 42 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). 
 43 Hall, Constitutional Law (1915) 49; Grinnell, Supreme Court of the United States and 
the Advisory Opinion (1924) 10 A. B. A. J. 522, 523; Beck, The Supreme Court of the United 
States (1925) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 139, 150; cf. Hughes, Supreme Court of the United States 
(1928) 32; Shephard, Democracy in Transition (1935) 29 AM. Pol.. Scl. Rev. 1, 17. 
 44 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989); See Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725. 
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authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.”45 The doctrine of separation of 
powers was conceived to avoid the pitfalls of the English rule and as a precaution 
against excessive concentration of power in any one arm of government.46 Justice 
Jackson summarized the pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental 
power: 
[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.47 
“[T]he greatest security,” wrote Madison, “consists in giving to those who 
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”48 
As a result, no one institution can become so powerful in a democracy as to 
destroy this system. Checks and balances, rights of mutual control and influence, 
make sure that the three powers interact in an equitable and balanced way. The 
separation of powers is an essential element of the rule of law, and is enshrined 
in the American Constitution. 
X. CONCLUSION 
In summary, there is no constitutional bar to the SCC undertaking an 
advisory role. The reference procedure has some benefits, such as being a quasi-
binding decision on limited stakeholders and lengthy litigation. Nevertheless, 
Canada should eliminate the reference procedure and limit judges to opine on 
matters of actual controversy, as is the case in the United States. In the United 
States, advisory opinions would violate the separation of powers doctrine and are 
deemed unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution. 
The Canadian reference procedure solicits key questions: why would 
politicians delegate some of their decision making power to the courts? What 
does the phenomena of reference questions mean for the notion of a separation of 
powers in Canada? Why is government the only entity that can make use of the 
reference procedure? Does the reference procedure reduce litigation at the 
expense of real parties in interest? Why would Canadian politicians have no 
quarrels delegating their decision-making authority by way of the reference 
procedure? 
The answers to these questions are complex. However, the question 
regarding politicians’ delegation of power can be answered simply. Canadian 
politicians give up some power in exchange of being relieved of responsibility 
 
 45 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
 46 Many political scientists believe that separation of powers is a key factor in what they 
view as a limited degree of American exceptionalism. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AMERICA THE 
UNUSUAL, (1st ed. 1999). 
 47 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring 
opinion). 
 48 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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should the court’s opinion not conform with voters’ expectations. Therefore, the 
delegation of powers can benefit the politician by increasing credit, and at the 
same time, reducing blame attributed to the politician as a result of the policy 
decision of the delegated body.49 
In the United States, under a separation of powers analysis, the Executive 
Office is unable to directly challenge the constitutionality of a piece of proposed 
legislation and therefore unable to access the SCOTUS through advisory 
opinions. Thus, in the United States, the executive branch of government is 
unable to circumvent typical litigation. This is starkly different to Canada, where 
the executive is able to do so. The Prime Minister can utilize the reference 
procedure to question the legality of proposed legislation. As you will recall, this 
was done in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage.50 In the United States, unhindered 
access to the courts is considered a threat to the traditional notion of the 
separation of powers. Meanwhile, in Canada, the fusion of the executive with the 
legislature diminishes the notion of a pure separation of powers. 
In addition to blame avoidance, politicians’ delegation of power to the 
judicial branch through the use of “reference questions” may be a tactical 
decision to realize a certain goal when there is a lack of political capital. Thus, a 
lack of political capital is not determinative, as the executive has direct access to 
the courts to determine the constitutionality of legislation, bypassing the 
requirement to obtain a certain level of support of voting Members of Parliament. 
Again, this is impermissible in the United States. 
Let us consider a situation where United States Congress members opposed 
proposed legislation: the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act, commonly 
referred to as “Obamacare.” One of the key issues amongst Republicans with 
Obamacare is that the United States Constitution is a document intended to 
preserve liberty, by way of limiting the powers of the federal government and it 
reserves most governmental powers to the states. From this vantage point, 
Obamacare strips powers reserved for the states and attacks the freedom of 
individuals. Whatever the merits of this argument are, opposing Republicans, 
even the President himself, could not make a lawful request for clarification on 
the constitutionality of this law. Rather, Obamacare was first passed as law, then 
challenged. 
Legislation being passed and then challenged is an important series of events 
that is starkly different from the Canadian method of reviewing contentious 
legislation. First, they ensure that all matters of legislation are treated equally in 
the eyes of the SCOTUS. The SCOTUS does not discuss the constitutionality of 
hypothetical, or proposed, legislation. Rather, the SCOTUS reviews laws already 
enacted, those actually ripe for review. Second, by doing so, this leads to an 
efficient and predictable enforcement process of Constitutional issues. This is 
important for both lawmakers and citizens, to ensure with absolute certainty, that 
the SCOTUS, by way of checks and balances, will review overzealous politicians 
 
 49 Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose 
to Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289, 294-95 (2002). 
 50 See supra note 37. 
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passing unscrupulous laws. Additionally, such procedural parameters prevent the 
executive from attempting to cherry-pick the SCOTUS’s docket. 
In addition, the threshold to promulgate a reference case is significantly 
lower when compared to civil litigation; usual restrictions relating to standing 
and mootness do not apply. The statutory restrictions that apply in ordinary 
litigation do not apply to reference questions. Take again the example of 
Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, where the Government of Canada submitted 
three questions to the Supreme Court regarding the validity of its proposed same-
sex marriage legislation.51 In that reference, the aggrieved same-sex couples were 
not even named parties. 
The failure to heed to such restrictions results in an inefficient and 
unpredictable enforcement process of Constitutional issues. The standing 
doctrine’s purpose is to ensure that courts do not render advisory opinions, and 
instead, resolve genuine controversies between adverse parties. Meanwhile, 
mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: the requisite personal 
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must 
continue throughout its existence (mootness).”52 The U.S. Constitution does not 
grant the authority for courts to decide cases merely to make precedents. 
Bypassing such procedural constraints, Canadian courts no longer become “an 
enduring feature of Canadian constitutional landscape,” as described by Osgoode 
Hall Law School Dean, Lorne Sossin.53 Rather, Canadian courts become a 
junior-varsity legislature. This is both worrisome and striking. 
By way of a wave of judicial activism, the “reference question” procedure is 
a detrimental and dangerous device and its use ought to be abolished, or severely 
restricted, in order to respect the separation of powers doctrine. The Government 
of Canada must enact and adopt a uniform set of judicial jurisdictional 
parameters, one that respects the Canadian Constitution as a “living tree,” all the 
while, objectively limiting the types of reviewable cases, thus enabling Justices 
to: (i) treat all matters equally; (ii) lead to an efficient and predictable 
enforcement process of Constitutional issues; and (iii) reduce abuse by 
politicians attempting to use the reference procedure for political gain. 
The vicissitudes of Canadian democratic politics illustrate that continued use 
of the reference procedure is an injustice. That is, even when government 
attempts to obscure use of the reference procedure in a fog, its use is distinct and 
so vivid that there can be no mistake as to its clear disregard of the fundamental 
separation of powers and democratic governance principles. 
 
 
 51 See supra note 37. 
 52 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 
 53 Lorne Sossin, The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal 
Rights, 23 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 93, 93-113 (2010). 
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